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b 
Public and private sector organisations are now able to 
capture and utilise data on a vast scale, thus heightening the 
importance of adequate measures for protecting unauthorised 
disclosure of personal information. In this respect, data breach 
notification has emerged as an issue of increasing importance 
throughout the world. It has been the subject of law reform in the 
United States and in other jurisdictions. This article reviews US, 
Australian and EU legal developments regarding the mandatory 
notification of data breaches. The authors highlight areas of concern 
based on the extant US experience that require further consideration 
in Australia and in the EU. 
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1. Introduction 
An estimated 341 million records containing personal or sensitive person 
information have been disclosed in the United States (US) without proper 
authorisation since 2005.1 Unauthorised disclosure of personal information can 
take several forms.2
                                                          
1 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches (2009) 
<http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#CP> at 18 December 2009. 
 For example, the theft of computer equipment or storage 
2 See e.g. United States Government Accountability Office, 'Personal Information: Data 
Breaches Are Frequent, But Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, 
the Full Extent Is Unknown' (GAO-07-737, 2007);  C M Curtin and L T Ayres, Using 
Science to Combat Data Loss: Analyzing Breaches by Type and Industry (2009) 
<http://web.interhack.com/publications/breach-taxonomy> at 29 April 2009; F J Garcia, 
'Data Protection, Breach Notification, and the Interplay Between State and Federal Law: 
The Experiments Need More Time' (2007) 17(3) Fordham Intellectual Property, Media 
& Entertainment Law Journal 693.  
  
media,3 computer hacking incidents that take advantage of ineffective 
information security measures,4 the inadvertent publication of personal 
information,5 the improper decommissioning of storage media or the 
misappropriation of personal information by employees.67 The scale of the US 
problem is captured by a Harris Poll conducted in October 2006.8 Researchers 
led by Professor Alan Westin, surveyed over 2,000 US citizens and found that 
22% of respondents claimed to have received notification from one or more 
organisations that their personal information had been lost, stolen or improperly 
disclosed between 2003 and 2006. It is possible, based on an extrapolation of 
these figures, that 49 million US citizens may have potentially received formal 
notification of a data breach of their personal information.9
The continuous, and seemingly never-ending, procession of high-profile 
US data breaches generated sufficient levels of public concern to warrant the 
involvement of US legislators, initially at state level and eventually in 
Washington. A new subset of law developed – mandatory data breach 
notification that incorporates elements of privacy regulation, consumer 
protection and corporate governance mechanisms regarding the security of 
personal information and information systems. The first of these laws, 
Californian Civil Code § 1798.29(a) was a direct response to the advent of large-




Since their enactment, US data breach notification laws have highlighted 
the significance of the data breach problem, prompting legal developments in 
  
                                                          
3 See e.g. Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General, 'Review of Issues 
Related to the Loss of VA Information Involving the Identity of Millions of Veterans' 
(Department of Veterans Affairs, 2006). 
4 See e.g. J Pereira, 'Breaking The Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out Wireless 
Door - In Biggest Known Theft, Retailer's Weak Security Lost Millions of Numbers', 
The Wall Street Journal (New York), 4 May 2007 2007, A1. 
5 Nj.com, N.J. accidentally reveals personal data of 28K unemployed residents (2009) 
<http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/3k_unemployed_nj_residents_may.html> 
at 9 June 2009. 
6 See e.g. Computer Security Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'Computer 
Crime and Security Survey' (2006) 12. 
7 See e.g. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, 'The Internal Revenue 
Service is Not Adequately Protecting Taxpayer Data on Laptop Computers and Other 
Portable Electronic Media Devices' (Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, 
2007). 
8 Harris Interactive, Many U.S. Adults Claim to Have Been Notified that Personal 
Information Has Been Improperly Disclosed (2006) 
<http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=708> at June 9 2009. 
9 Ibid. 
10 K E Picanso, 'Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data Breach 
Notification Law' (2006) 75(1) Fordham Law Review 355, 369. 
  
other jurisdictions11
This article examines the development and application of mandatory data 
breach notification laws and the authors highlight key concerns based on the US 
literature that should inform Australian and EU developments. Section 2 details 
the development of data breach notification laws from their genesis in the US. 
Section 3 explains what is known about Australian data breaches and outlines 
recent legislative proposals for an Australian data breach notification scheme. 
Section 4 highlights recent EU developments. Section 5 then highlights issues to 
be resolved regarding Australian and EU developments and concluding 
observations are set forth in Section 6. 
 including Australia and the European Union (EU). 
Australian developments focus on amendments to the Privacy Act (Cth) 1988 
(hereafter “Privacy Act”) and EU initiatives are centred on Directive 
2002/58/EC (hereafter “e-Privacy Directive”).  
 
2. US Data Breach Notification Laws  
The first mandatory data breach notification law was enacted by the 
Californian legislature in 2003. The Californian Civil Code § 1798.29(a) 
requires: 
‘[a]ny person or business that conducts business in California, and 
that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal 
information, [to] disclose any breach of the security of the system 
following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of 
the data to any resident of California whose unencrypted personal 
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by 
an unauthorized person.’ 
Accordingly, any Californian business that suffered a data breach of 
unencrypted and computerised personal information, which entails an 
unauthorised acquisition by another person, is required to notify Californian 
residents about the incident. Organisations are to notify individuals within a 
timeframe that is expedient and without reasonable delay. However, law 
enforcement agencies can request a delay if notification would impede a 
criminal investigation. The actual form of organisational notification can be 
made by letter, electronically in conformance with federal regulations or by a 
form of substitute notice, entailing email, or “conspicuous posting” on the 
organisation’s website or via state media sources. The latter option is only 
available if the data breach involved more than half a million individuals or 
would exceed a cost of over $250,000.  
In accordance with the Code, not all data breaches need to be notified as 
the law contains a range of exemptions. For example, a data breach does not 
need to be notified if it relates to a good faith acquisition of personal information 
by an employee or agent of the breaching organisation or if the personal 
information acquired without authorisation is encrypted. Additionally, the 
                                                          
11 E Preston and P Turner, 'The Global Rise of a Duty to Disclose Information Security 
Breaches' (2004) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 457. 
  
Californian law only covers data breaches of computerised information and thus 
provides a detailed and limiting definition of personal information. Essentially, 
this means an individual’s name in combination with one or more other 
identifying items - such as a social security number, state driver licence or ID 
number, financial account number details, medical or health insurance details.  
The definition of personal information signifies a key underlying rationale 
of the Californian data breach notification law – that organisational notification 
provides individuals with a means to protect themselves from adverse 
consequences of unauthorised acquisition of their personal information, 
specifically in the form of identity theft or identity fraud related crimes.12 The 
cogency of this rationale appeared to have been borne out almost immediately, 
post implementation of the Californian law, after notification by Choicepoint, 
one of the largest data brokerage firms in the US, of a major data breach 
incident.13 In February 2005, criminals posing as a small business were able to 
gain access to Choicepoint’s data as a legitimate subscriber of their services. The 
criminals acquired personal information of 163,000 persons, which culminated 
over 800 incidents of identity theft.14
However, commentators and a series of studies have since questioned 




                                                          
12 California Office of Privacy Protection, 'Recommended Practices on Notice of 
Security Breach Involving Personal Information (California Office of Privacy Protection, 
2008): 6. 
 Nonetheless, the Californian law had an imminent effect in exposing 
the number and scale of data breaches involving businesses registered in the 
state. It is not surprising therefore, that the law has effectively become a de facto 
legislative model for data breach notification schemes through its rapid and ad 
hoc adoption by other US states. By the end of 2005, three states had also 
enacted data breach legislation based on the Californian model and by the 
following year, 35 USA states had introduced 60 bills that resulted in 21 enacted 
laws. At present, 45 states, the District of Columbia and two territories (Puerto 
13 P N Otto, A I Anton and D L Baumer, 'The ChoicePoint Dilemma: How Data Brokers 
Should Handle the Privacy of Personal Information' (2007) 5(5) IEEE Security & 
Privacy 15. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See e.g. United States Government Accountability Office, 'Personal Information: Data 
Breaches Are Frequent, But Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, 
the Full Extent Is Unknown' (GAO-07-737, 2007); Javelin Strategy & Research, 'Data 
Breaches and Identity Fraud: Misunderstanding Could Fail Consumers and Burden 
Businesses' (Javelin Strategy & Research, 2006); B St. Amant, 'Misplaced Role of 
Identity Theft in Triggering Public Notice of Database Breaches' (2007) 44 Harvard 
Journal on Legislation, 505; S Romanosky, R Telang, and Acquisti, Do Data Breach 
Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft? (2008), http://ssrn.com/paper=1268926 at July 
22, 2009. 
  
Rico and the Virgin Islands)16 have enacted data breach notification laws, of 
which, 23 are based solely on the Californian model.17
Whilst the majority of the US state laws are largely based on the 
Californian model, there is some variation between them, particularly in relation 
to the elements that “trigger” a statutory obligation to notify.
   
18 The California 
law has a relatively low ‘triggering threshold’ because notification is required 
simply when an organisation has suffered, or believes it has suffered, an 
unauthorised acquisition of unencrypted and computerised personal 
information.19 Other states have attempted to raise the triggering threshold to 
reduce the potential of “notification fatigue” caused by incessant and 
unnecessary notification.20 Accordingly, some state laws require further 
triggering elements, such as the need for a reasonable likelihood of harm or 
material harm21 arising from the breach which thus reduces the scope of 
notification by limiting it to those incidents where potential harms are likely. 
Other triggering elements include a reasonable likelihood of substantial 
economic loss,22 a significant or material risk of identity theft or other frauds23 
and whether a data breach has or is reasonably likely to cause loss or injury.24 In 
conjunction with the higher triggering thresholds, some states also require 
organisations to conduct a reasonable or good faith investigation promptly after 
a data breach to determine whether affected individuals or law enforcement 
agencies need to be notified.25
Another key difference regards additional notification of a data breach to 
law enforcement or consumer credit agencies. For instance, in some states, it is 
mandatory to inform either the relevant law enforcement agency or state 
  
                                                          
16 See e.g. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification 
Laws (2009) 
<http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/Secur
ityBreachNotificationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx> at 14 June 2009. 
17 P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of Data Security Breaches' (2007) 105(5) 
Michigan Law Review 913, 924. 
18 D J Solove and C J Hoofnagle, 'Model Regime of Privacy Protection' (2006)  
University of Illinois Law Review 357, 397; T J Smedinghoff, 'Trends in the Law of 
Information Security' (2005) 17 Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal 1(5). 
19 P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of data security breaches' (2007) 105(5) 
Michigan Law Review 913, 924. 
20 F H Cate, Information Security Breaches: Looking Back and Thinking Ahead (2008) 
<http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/2308/Information_Security
_Breaches_Cate.pdf>, 12. 
21 Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, North Carolina and Oregon. 
22 Arizona. 
23 Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah and 
Wisconsin. 
24 Michigan, Montana and Pennsylvania. 
25 Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire and Utah. 
  
regulator so they can take action to minimise the negative consequences of the 
breach.26 Similarly, some states require organisations to contact credit-reporting 
agencies so that credit card accounts can be monitored from an early stage and 
before serious attempts at fraud are made.27 Further variations result from 
different definitions of personal information that have the effect of broadening 
the scope of the Californian model by adding further elements that constitute 
personal information.28 Likewise, the manner in which personal information is 
held or maintained is important. For instance, some statutes extend the 
disclosure obligation beyond electronically held information to include personal 
data held in hard copy or other form.29 Finally, another substantial variation 
relates to the fact that some statutes impose pecuniary measures, via 
enforcement through private rights of civil action or via the imposition of civil 
penalties or fines for failure to notify.30
Despite the existence of specific state laws, some commentators have 
argued that a US federal data breach notification law could potentially have a 
number of advantages over its state counterparts. First, a federal law would 
apply nationally, thus overcoming the limitations of state focused laws that only 
require notification to state residents.
 One state, Michigan even has a criminal 
offence for situations involving false notice. 
31
                                                          
26 Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
New York City, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, Virginia and West Virginia. 
 Second, a federal law would provide an 
opportunity to harmonise the distinct requirements of different state laws by 
27 Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
28 See e.g. District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, 
Puerto Rico and Vermont (regarding credit or debit card number); Arkansas, Michigan, 
Puerto Rico and also California (regarding medical information); Alaska, District of 
Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, North Carolina, Puerto Rico and Vermont (regarding 
account passwords or other codes) and Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico and Wisconsin (regarding 
other miscellaneous provisions).  
29 Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York and Utah. 
30 Alaska, Indiana, Texas and Virginia (regarding liability to the state for civil penalty); 
Florida, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto 
Rico, Texas, Utah and Virginia (regarding fine or legal action for individual violations); 
District of Columbia (regarding fine for failure to document breach); Idaho, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island (regarding fine incurred for failure to notify 
affected parties).  
31 J J Darrow and S D Lichtenstein, "Do You Really Need My Social Security Number?" 
Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age' (2008) 10(1) North Carolina Journal of 
Law & Technology 1, 53. 
  
establishing one uniform law, based on one triggering threshold, thus 
simplifying regulatory requirements for trans-state business organisations.32
It should, of course, be noted that some federal data breach notification 
obligations do currently exist in the form of Interagency Guidance
   
33 for financial 
institutions about how and when to notify a breach. Despite the benefits that 
could arise from a uniform federal law, the existing assortment of current federal 
legislative proposals seems to mirror the confusing array of data breach 
notification provisions at state level. In 2005 alone, seven separate House and 
Senate committees addressed data breach issues and by 2007, 20 separate Bills 
had been put forward.34 However, no consensus as to the scope of a new federal 
law emerged because different committees had divergent priorities that centred 
on the key issue of the triggering threshold.35 The Bills reflect the same 
conflicting discussions that have already taken place at state level.36 For 
example, the first proposed Bill, in January 2005, used the Californian model as 
a basis for regulating the data broker industry.37 Other Bills have contained 
higher triggering thresholds requiring the existence of a significant risk to 
individuals or the likelihood that personal financial information could be 
misused in a manner that causes substantial harm or inconvenience to 
consumers. One Bill attempted to remove the link between data breach 
notification and identity theft38  whilst another required a significant risk of 
identity theft as a trigger for notification.39
Following this somewhat confused state of affairs, the House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection 
finally passed a Bill, in June 2009, for the enactment of the Data Accountability 
and Trust Act (DATA) as a first step in the process of establishing a 
comprehensive federal data breach notification law. DATA was passed by the 
House of Representatives in December 2009 and will proceed to the Senate for 
   
                                                          
32 S Lee, 'Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and Data Safeguarding 
Now Apply to Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs' (2006) 1(1) Entrepreneurial Business 
Law Journal 125, 136. 
33 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 'Interagency Guidance on Response 
Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice' 
(2005). 
34 B Faulkner, 'Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws' (2007) 59(5) Florida Law 
Review 1097, 1119. 
35 S Lee, 'Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and Data Safeguarding 
Now Apply to Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs' (2006) 1(1) Entrepreneurial Business 
Law Journal 125: 136. 
36 B St. Amant, 'Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in Triggering Public Notice of 
Database Breaches' (2007) 44 Harvard Journal on Legislation 505, 510. 
37 The same bill, the Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act Bill 2005 was put forward 
by the Californian Democrat Senator, Dianne Feinstein and was re-introduced for a 
fourth time in January 2009.  
38 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act Bill 2005 
39 Data Accountability and Trust Act Bill 2005 
  
ratification before confirmation of enactment by President Obama. Should 
DATA overcome these two remaining hurdles, then a federal data breach 
notification law could be in place in 2010.  
 
3. Australian Developments 
Thus far, unlike the US, relatively few major data breaches have been 
reported publicly reported in Australia. The most publicised examples include an 
Australian bank’s cancellation of thousands of credit cards following a third 
party vendor security breach40 and an Australian Army officer who inadvertently 
left a laptop at Melbourne Airport that contained data relating to an investigation 
into the controversial death of an Australian serviceman in Iraq.41
It is therefore difficult to quantify the extent of data breaches in Australia. 
However, government and industry surveys confirm that data breaches are 
taking place.
 
42 In 2006, ACNeilsen, on behalf of Australian police forces and the 
Australia’s computer emergency response team (AusCERT) conducted the 
Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey.43 Researchers surveyed 2,024 
IT Managers from seventeen different industry groupings in both public and 
private sectors about computer crime related attacks and information security 
issues. The survey generated a 17% response rate and 389 responses were 
received. The researchers concluded that 20% of all industry respondents had 
detected some form of data breach and that the average annual cost to 
organisations from computer crimes or unauthorised access was AUS$241,000. 
The researchers also found that 69 per cent of respondents chose not to report a 
data breach outside of their organisation, citing a number of reasons including 
negative publicity and a lack of faith in law enforcement agencies.44 In 2008, a 
survey conducted on behalf of the IT security firm, Symantec, reported that in 
the past five years, 80% of Australian organisations have experienced data 
breaches, with over half suspecting that their business had suffered undetected 
data breaches.45
                                                          
40 L Tung, Westpac Accepts No Blame in Security Breach (2007) ZDNet Australia 
<http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/soa/Westpac-accepts-no-blame-in-security-
breach/0,130061744,339280311,00.htm> at 8 June 2009. 
 Finally, in 2009, the Ponemon Institute conducted a survey of 
482 Australia based IT and business managers about encryption practices and 
data breaches. A total of 69% of organisations surveyed encountered a data 
breach during the last twelve months and 25% of these organisations 
encountered five or more data breaches. Despite these breaches taking place, 
41 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Defence Dept Review Ordered After Kovco Disc 
Left at Airport (2006) <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2006/s1642048.htm> at 8 
June 2009. 
42 Response rates of both surveys are low so some degree of caution applies when 
considering results that could be affected by non-response bias. 
43 AusCERT, Australian Crime & Security Survey (2006). 
44 Ibid., 35. 
45 K Dearne, 'Data Breach Hits 80% of Local Companies: Survey', The Australian 22 
October 2008.  
  
only 35% of those organisations that encountered a breach publicly disclosed 
information about the breach.46
Given the increasing international focus on data breach notification laws, 
it is not surprising that there are moves to implement a data breach notification 
law in Australia. These moves differ from those which occurred in the US 
inasmuch as they have federal focus that relies on the Privacy Act as the vehicle 
to implement a data breach notification measure. Whilst, at present, there is no 
specific obligation under the Privacy Act which requires Australian 
organisations to notify individuals or regulators about a data breach, the Act 
does oblige both public and private sector organizations to implement adequate 
security measures to ensure the integrity of personal information. In August 
2007, Senator Stott-Despoja of the Australian Democrats presented a private 
members Bill to the Senate entitled the Privacy (Data Security Breach 
Notification) Amendment Bill. The Bill sought to amend the Privacy Act so as 
to “require organisations and agencies [to] notify affected individuals of a breach 
of data security where their personal information is accessed by, or disclosed to, 
an unauthorised person, and for related purposes”.
  
47
“Any unauthorised acquisition, transmission, use or disclosure of 
personal information involving an unauthorised party will 
constitute a data security breach and potentially be an interference 
with an individual’s privacy”.
 The Bill was a hybrid of the 
Californian law and existing provisions of the Privacy Act as reflected in the 
content of the notification trigger, namely: 
48
Apart from legislative initiatives, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
(OPC) published, in 2008, a set of voluntary guidelines entitled the “Guide to 
Handling Personal Information Security Breaches”.
  
49 The OPC Guidelines are 
similar to those published in Canada and New Zealand inasmuch as they are 
intended “to assist agencies and organisations to respond effectively to a 
personal information security breach” and specifically to identify those 
situations when an effective response required notification to individuals.50
                                                          
46 Ponemon Institute, Encryption Trends - Australia (2009). 
 The 
OPC Guidelines also use the phrase “personal information security breach” 
instead of the term “data breach” in the interests of consistency with the 
language of the Privacy Act. Whilst the examples provided in the Guidelines 
essentially address the same issues as the US data breach notification laws do, 
the underlying rationale for notification is different to that of the US laws as the 
OPC Guidelines are not solely concerned with the mitigation of identity theft 
related crimes. Instead, notification is deemed good privacy practice on the basis 
47 See Hansard, 'Commowealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates' (2007). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Guide to Handling Personal Information 
Security Breaches (2008) <http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/breach_guide.pdf> at 
27 April 2009. 
50 Ibid., 5. 
  
that it can act as a reasonable security safeguard whilst at the same time 
encouraging enhanced transparency about organisational privacy practices, thus 
restoring a degree of individual control over personal information.51
Moreover, the triggering threshold adopted in the OPC Guidelines is 
higher than that which was put forward in the Stott-Despoja Bill as it requires 
that notification should only take place where there is a “real risk of serious 
harm to the individual”.
 
52
“While notification is an important mitigation strategy, it will not 
always be the appropriate response to a breach. Providing 
notification about low risk breaches can cause undue anxiety and 
de-sensitise individuals to notice. Each incident needs to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether breach 
notification is required.”
 Although the Guidelines do not define a “real risk of 
serious harm,” the reason for the higher trigger appears to be the notification 
fatigue argument expressed in the US literature: 
53
In 2008, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) released its 
voluminous final report reviewing the Privacy Act in the context of Australian 
privacy law generally.
 
54 In relation to data breach notification, the report 
concluded that there was general support for the introduction of a mandatory 
national data breach notification scheme in Australia which, in its view, should 
be overseen by the Federal Privacy Commissioner. The ALRC’s 
recommendation to use the Privacy Act as the vehicle for a data breach 
notification obligation was based on the view that the concept of data breach 
notification is consistent with the general aims of the Act and encourages 
agencies and organisations “to be transparent about their information-handling 
practices”.55 That said, the primary purpose of notification is the mitigation of 
damage caused by a breach, rather than the provision of some sort a mechanism 
of reputational sanction.56 The ALRC acknowledged that reputational damage 
from notification can provide incentives to improve information security but 
concluded that the risk of embarrassment was not, in itself, a sufficient market 
control measure and that legislation was therefore warranted.57
‘An agency or organisation is required to notify the Privacy 
Commissioner and affected individuals when specified personal 
information has been, or is reasonably believed to have been, 
acquired by an unauthorised person and the agency, organisation or 
 The notification 
trigger recommended by the ALRC provides: 
                                                          
51 Ibid., 12. 
52 Ibid., 22. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law 
and Practice (2008). 
55 Ibid., 1688. 
56 Ibid., 1689. 
57 Ibid. 
  
Privacy Commissioner believes that the unauthorised acquisition 
may give rise to a real risk of serious harm to any affected 
individual.’58
Like the OPC Guidelines, the ALRC’s recommended trigger is based on a 
real risk of serious harm. The ALRC acknowledged that this trigger is higher 
than the “any unauthorized acquisition” test of the Californian law but contended 
that the purpose of a higher triggering threshold was to reduce the risks arising 
from notification fatigue as well as to reduce the compliance burdens on 
organisations.
 
59 The ALRC concluded that a higher triggering threshold would 
allow the data collecting organisation “to investigate the data breach and make 
an assessment of whether the unauthorised acquisition may give rise to a real 
risk of serious harm to an individual”.60
The factors entailed in the assessment of “serious harm” recommended by 
the ALRC are not necessarily confined solely to identity theft issues but should 
also cover wider concerns of discrimination from the release of personal 
information. Additionally, organisations would be encouraged to decide 
themselves when the triggering event occurs and to develop their own standards 




The ALRC’s recommended notification requirement is also “technology 
neutral” as it covers all unauthorised access to personal information, whether in 
computerised or in hard copy form. The existing definition of “personal 
information” in the Privacy Act would be substantially limited for data breach 
notification purposes 
 However, a degree of oversight was also envisaged on the basis 
that it would be “preferable” for organisations to consult with the OPC about 
notification so that the Privacy Commissioner could require notification if there 
is a belief that the unauthorised acquisition of personal information gives rise to 
a real risk of serious harm to any affected individual. 
“Specified personal information” draws on both the definition of 
‘personal’ and ‘sensitive’ information currently existing and 
prescribes combinations of information that would “when acquired 
without authorisation, give rise to a real risk of serious harm 
requiring notification”.62
According to the ALRC, such information is likely to include an 
individual’s name and address in combination with other identifying information 




                                                          
58 Ibid. 
 Finally, the ALRC recommended that a civil penalty should be 
instigated against data collecting organisations for a failure to notify the OPC of 
59 Ibid., 1691. 
60 Ibid., 1690. 
61 Ibid., 1691. 
62 Ibid., 1693. 
63 Ibid., 1694. 
  
a reportable data breach and for situations where organisations blatantly 
disregard the law. The Australian Government, in its response to the ALRC’s 
report, has confirmed that the issue of mandatory data breach notification is to 
be addressed in a second tranche of proposed measures planned for 2010 and 
will include an extensive consultation exercise.64
 
 
4. EU Developments 
Like Australia, there is a measure of legislative sentiment regarding the 
extended coverage of mandatory data breach notification. This may in some part 
be driven by the catalogue of large-scale data breaches that have been reported 
in the United Kingdom (UK) during the last three years.65
However, the EU situation differs to that of the US both in terms of the 
approach to data protection
 The UK data breaches 
have provided evidence of a systemic failure to securely store and maintain 
personal information involving one of the EU’s own member states. This of 
course raises a concerning question that if such incidents are regularly taking 
place in one member state then are they happening in equal measure in other 
member states? 
66 and data breach notification. Unlike the US which 
has adopted a sectoral approach to privacy that focuses on specific privacy 
issues arising in certain sectors or settings, the EU has developed a 
comprehensive data protection directive (95/46/EC)67
                                                          
64 Cabinet Secretary Special Minister of State, Report on Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice (2008), http://www.smos.gov.au/media/2008/mr_262008_joint.html. at July 19, 
2009; Australian Government, 'Enhancing Privacy Protection: Australian Government 
First Stage Response to the Australian Law Reform Commission Report 108' (2009) 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/stage1_aus_govt_response.pdf  at October 
15 2009. 
 (hereafter “Data 
Protection Directive”) that enshrines uniform obligations on member states via 
national legislation, modelled on the directive. The EU’s approach to data breach 
notification has also been different and has been open to a number of public 
disagreements between the European Council, the European Parliament and the 
65 See e.g. S Saxby, 'UK Needs Stronger Regulation of Public Sector Data Policy' (2008) 
24(1) Computer Law & Security Report 1; S Pritchard, 'Battle of the Sectors: Where is 
Your Data Safe?' 6(5) Infosecurity 23. 
66 For the purposes of this article, the terms ‘data protection’ and ‘information privacy’ 
are used interchangeably. However, the authors acknowledge the distinctions between 
both legal concepts. See e.g. S Davies, 'Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How 
Privacy Has Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity' in Philip Agre and Marc 
Rotenberg (eds), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape (1997); R Clarke, 
Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of Terms (2006) 
<http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Intro.html> at 30 April 2009. 
67 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data [the Data Protection Directive], OJ L 281, 23/11/1995, 31–
50.  
  
Article 29 Working Group regarding the extent, scope and requirement of 
mandatory data breach notification in the EU. 
Rather than opting for a universal obligation that covers all organisations 
in member states, the EU has thus far focused attention on the 
telecommunications sector, perhaps because an existing form of data breach 
notification was already in place. The e-Privacy Directive concerns issues 
relating to the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy for 
publicly available services provided by the electronic communications sector.68 
The Directive’s definition of electronic communication services is broad and has 
been construed by different member states to include other organisations beyond 
telecommunications operators, despite that being the primary purpose of the 
Directive. Article 4 of the e-Privacy Directive regards security and 4(1) obliges a 
provider of a publicly available electronic communications services to ensure 
that ‘a level of security appropriate to the risk presented’ is provided. Article 
4(2) regards breach notification. It states that a provider must inform 
subscribers69 about a potential risk arising from a breach of network security that 
is beyond the scope of the provider to resolve. Furthermore, a service provider 
must notify the subscriber about possible remedies and provide an indication of 
the likely costs involved.70
The e-Privacy Directive differs substantially from the purpose of US data 
breach notification laws as it has a much wider ambit about the type of situations 
and the sort of information that will trigger notification of a data breach. As 




                                                          
68 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications, also 
known as the e-Privacy Directive), OJ L 201, 31/07/2002, 37–47. 
 whereas the e-Privacy Directive simply states that notification is 
required where there is a breach of network security that lies beyond the 
provider to remedy. The e-Privacy Directive is therefore potentially more 
expansive than its US data breach legislative counterparts because it does not 
require a specified type of information to trigger notification. The European 
69 The e-Privacy Directive does not define subscribers. Instead the definition of 
subscribers is to be found at Article 2(k) of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) OJ L 108, 
24/04/2002 P. 33-50. It states “subscriber means any natural person or legal entity who 
or which is party to a contract with the provider of publicly available electronic 
communications services for the supply of such services”. 
70 Article 4(2), e-Privacy Directive 2002. 
71 Generally, personal information is defined in US data breach notification laws as an 
individual’s name in combination with one or more other identifying items. 
  
Commission has recently addressed this point.72 A new directive (hereafter 
“Proposed Directive”) has been formally approved by the European Council that 
will substantially amend and clarify the existing security breach notification 
requirements of the e-Privacy Directive.73
"[P]ersonal data breach" means a breach of security leading to the 
accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised 
disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or 
otherwise processed in connection with the provision of a publicly 
available electronic communications service in the Community".  
 Article 2(4)(c) of the Proposed 
Directive will insert a new clause 4(3) in the e-Privacy Directive that will require 
a provider of publicly available electronic communications services to notify a 
competent national authority about a personal data breach and the notification 
shall be conducted ‘without reasonable delay’. Moreover, Article 2(1)(2)(c) of 
the Proposed Directive now defines a personal data breach 
The addition of a new Article 4(3) in the e-Privacy Directive now focuses 
mandatory data breach notification on situations that (a) relate to personal data 
(b) involve specified unauthorised uses of personal data and (c) personal data is 
stored or processed in connection with a publicly available electronic 
communications service. Whilst the definition of a personal data breach is a new 
component to the EU’s data protection framework, the definition of personal 
data nonetheless relies upon Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive.74 The 
EU therefore differs from both the US and the Australian approaches to data 
breach notification because it does not include a specifically modified definition 
of personal data (or information) for the purposes of data breach notification. 
Moreover, the definition of personal data under Article 2(a) is to be construed 
expansively rather than prohibitively.75
                                                          
72 At time of writing the new Directive has not been ratified by the Presidents’ of the 
Council and the Parliament and has not been published in the Official Journal. The 
proposed directive is therefore sited throughout the remainder of this article. 
 It remains to be seen how a broad 
definition of personal data will function within the regulatory environment of 
data breach notification that requires a degree of certainty to manage the 
73 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directives 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services and 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation (2007/0248 COD) 
PE-CONS 3674/09 (adopted at the GAERC Council of 26/10/2009) [hereafter ‘Proposed 
Directive’]. 
74 Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive, “any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or 
to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity”. 
75 See e.g. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, 01248/07/EN, WP 136. 
  
complex balancing act of multi-faceted aims, as highlighted in the next section 
below. 
Furthermore, a provider may also have to notify, without undue delay, a 
subscriber or an individual about a personal data breach if the breach is likely to 
adversely affect their personal data or privacy.76 However, a provider will not 
have to provide notification if it can demonstrate to the satisfaction of a 
competent authority that it has implemented appropriate technological protection 
mechanisms. Such mechanisms would render data unintelligible and the 
measures were applied to the personal data involved in the breach.77 That said, a 
competent national authority can require a provider to provide notification to a 
subscriber or an individual, upon consideration of the likely adverse effects of 
the breach and in situations where the provider has not already provided 
notification.78 Notification to subscribers and individuals is broadly similar to 
US measures as it requires a description of the breach, contact details of the 
provider and recommendations to mitigate potential adverse consequences. 
Moreover, the notification to a national authority requires a description of the 
consequences and the measures proposed to remedy the personal data breach.79 
A national authority can develop guidelines and issue instructions that set out 
minimum requirements for notification and the manner it is conducted.80
The Proposed Directive also has some interesting developments related to 
the statistical reporting of personal data breaches and the generation of best 
practice notification. First, a provider is required to maintain an inventory of 
personal data breaches that provides details of breaches, their effects and the 
actions taken.
  
81 The inventory will provide sufficient information for a national 
authority to verify actions taken about a breach but it will only include 
information necessary to fulfil the requirements of compiling the inventory. 
Second, the Commission may, following consultation with other bodies, and to 
ensure national consistency, adopt technical implementing measures regarding 
the circumstances, format and procedures relating to provider notification.82
Finally, Article 2(4)(a) and (b) of the Proposed Directive should also be 
noted. Article 2(4)(a) amends the title of the existing Article 4 of the e-Privacy 
Directive from “Security” to “Security of processing”. The new title is in 
keeping with the definition of a personal data breach in the Proposed Directive 
which indicates that the new e-Privacy Directive is intended to cover acts of data 
processing relating to the transfer of personal data and it is not just aimed at 
  
                                                          










securing the storage of personal data. This point is re-emphasised by Article 
2(4)(b) of the Proposed Directive which inserts a new clause 1(a) into Article 4 
of the e-Privacy Directive. Previously, Article 4(1) of the e-Privacy Directive 
obliged a provider to implement appropriate measures with respect to ensuring 
network security in light of the risks arising, current best practice and costs. The 
new Article 4(1)(a) of the amended e-Privacy Directive now specifies, without 
prejudice to the requirements of the Data Protection Directive, minimum 
requirements that constitute the implementation of appropriate security 
measures.83 Moreover, the security practices of providers shall be auditable by 
relevant national authorities who will be able to issue best practice 
recommendations about the level of security to be achieved.84
The issue of whether data breach notification should be extended to other 
sectors has been the source of much debate within the EU which is 
acknowledged in the preamble of the Proposed Directive. The preamble 
represents a major debate that has been taking place within the legislative organs 
of the EU about the scope of proposed legal reforms relating to the development 
of data breach notification rules. Initially the European Parliament had insisted 
that amendments to the e-Privacy Directive must also take account of other 
sectors that are integral to information society services, such as banks and other 
e-business service providers.
 
85 The proposal was also supported by the Article 
29 Working Party86 and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).87
                                                          
83 Article 2(4)(b) of the Proposed Directive and new Article 4(1)(a) of the e-Privacy 
Directive. These measures oblige providers to: ensure that personal data can be accessed 
only by authorised personnel for legally authorised purposes; protect personal data 
stored or transmitted against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or 
alteration, and unauthorised or unlawful storage, processing, access or disclosure, and 
ensure the implementation of a security policy with respect to the processing of personal 
data. 
 
However, both the Commission and the Council of Ministers were obdurate in 
their opposition to expanding data breach notification to the extent that the 
European Parliament finally withdrew its proposal for wider coverage and the 
Proposed Directive was therefore directed towards telecommunications 
84 Ibid. 
85 See e.g. OUT-LAW News, European Parliament Abandons Plan to Extend Data 
Breach Notification Law (2009) <http://www.out-law.com/default.aspx?page=10010> at 
October 20 2009. 
86 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 1/2009 on the proposals amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications (e-Privacy Directive)' 
(2009). 
87 European Data Protection Supervisor, 'Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending, among others, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications)' (2008) (OJ C181 18.07.2008) 
[hereafter ‘EDPS Opinion’]. 
  
providers only. However, as a major concession to both the Parliament and the 
EU’s own data protection experts, the preamble of the Proposed Directive 
acknowledges the wider social benefits that could arise from data breach 
notification.88
Mandatory data breach notification was specifically recognised as an 
important component of a wider data protection framework that would enable 
individuals to minimise economic loss and social harm arising from security 
failures involving personal information.
 
89 Accordingly, the preamble states that 
mandatory data breach notification requirements for all sectors should be 
introduced at the EU level as a matter of priority and the Commission should 
review relevant Community legislation to identify relevant legal issues. 
Moreover, and in the meantime, the Proposed Directive calls for the 
Commission, in consultation with the European Data Protection Supervisor, to 
take appropriate steps, without delay, to encourage the application of the new e-
Privacy Directive in all sectors.90
 
  
5. Issues Arising for Australian and EU Developments 
Bearing in mind both the Australian Government’s and the EU’s 
commitment to legislate, it is appropriate to consider some of the key issues 
arising from concerns related to the US literature and experience.  
 
5.1 A Problem Yet To Be Quantified 
Garcia emphasizes that data breach notification laws have proven 
extremely successful at highlighting an area of significant concern that was 
previously unknown.91 In effect, notification was necessary to highlight 
corporate inefficiencies regarding the security of personal information because 
otherwise there would be no incentive for organisations to report such 
problems.92 Schwartz and Janger also contend that one of the unexpected 
bonuses of data breach notification law has been that it has triggered innovative 
legislative and regulatory activity that has improved organisational practices and 
has created a “new stock of public information”, which has opened up the vaults 
of closed, private sector activity.93
                                                          
88 Proposed Directive, para. 59. 
 The Choicepoint incident provides a good 
example of the changes eluded to given that the company suffered two similar 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 F J Garcia, 'Data Protection, Breach Notification, and the Interplay Between State and 
Federal Law: The Experiments Need More Time' (2007) 17(3) Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 693, 701. 
92 Ibid.  
93 P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of Data Security Breaches' (2007) 105(5) 
Michigan Law Review 913, 956.  
  
data breaches before the implementation of the Californian law and were only 
required to notify because of that law.94
The AusCERT and the Computer Security Institute surveys, highlighted 
above, demonstrate this issue as a significant number of respondents in both 
surveys decided not to inform law enforcement agencies about data breaches.
 
95 
One of the main reasons cited in both pieces of research was the corporate fear 
that notification would have a detrimental impact on share price. However, 
research studies suggest that such fears are pertinent regarding the immediate 
effects of notification but much less so regarding long-term impact. For 
example, Acquisti et al examined 79 data breaches involving publicly listed 
companies between a period from 2000 to 2006 to ascertain the degree of impact 
on share price following notification.96
There is some degree of risk entailed in the “chicken and egg” scenario 
neatly described by Garcia because the underlying assumption behind the 
rationale is that data breaches are occurring in sufficient numbers and severity to 
justify the expense of regulation and a notification scheme will actually identify 
where and how data breaches are occurring. Furthermore, it should also be noted 
that quantitative research conducted in the Australian surveys, highlighted 
above, have very different estimates about the extent of data breaches and their 
impact.
 They noted a significant increase in the 
number of notifications following the implementation of the Californian law and 
that a smaller number of companies were responsible for a larger proportion of 
negative results. Overall, the negative impact to share price was relatively minor 
over the medium to long-term and had a more dramatic decline at the time of 
notification. Corporate concerns about the negative impact of notification may 
therefore not be as great as first appears.  
97
If Garcia’s assertion is correct, and the US experience certainly provides 
cogent support for the proposition that one of the unintended purposes of a data 
breach notification law is to provide a quantification mechanism for the extent of 
data breach assessment, then the adoption of a higher or lower triggering 
threshold will have a significant impact. A higher threshold will reduce the 
levels of notification whereas a lower threshold will have the opposite effect. 
The adoption of a higher threshold at the onset of implementation may make it 
 At present, therefore, it is unknown to what extent data breaches are 
taking place in Australia. 
                                                          
94 P N Otto, A I Anton and D L Baumer, 'The ChoicePoint Dilemma: How Data Brokers 
Should Handle the Privacy of Personal Information' (2007) 5(5) IEEE Security & 
Privacy 15, 21. 
95 AusCERT, Australian Crime & Security Survey (2006), 45; Computer Security 
Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'Computer Crime and Security Survey' 
(2006) 35.  
96 A Acquisti, A Friedman and R Telang, Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event 
Study  (2006) http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-friedman-telang-
privacy-breaches.pdf at July 19, 2009. 
97  AusCERT, Australian Crime & Security Survey (2006), 45. 
  
impossible for regulators and lawmakers to know the extent and type of data 
breaches occurring especially when responsibility for deciding when notification 
resides with the organisation that has suffered a data breach, as suggested by the 
ALRC. Previous research has already revealed reluctance amongst organisations 
to notify data breaches to the limited audience of law enforcement agencies and 
it is difficult to see why that would change through the onset of a higher 
threshold trigger. It could be the case that truly successful data breach 
notification laws require a degree of trial and error in implementation, as Garcia 
points out 
“It is far too premature to determine the best methods for ensuring 
the protection of consumer data, and the states should be allowed 
to continue to experiment to generate new ideas, testing the range 
of state laws against the ongoing breaches.”98
It appears that a more robust quantification of the extent of Australian data 
breaches would be an extremely useful first step regarding the implementation of 
a data breach notification law. Such research could provide essential data about 
breaches that would enable lawmakers to make an accurate assessment about the 
level of triggering threshold required. In some respects, the cart has already been 
put before the horse by the development of the OPC’s voluntary guidelines and 
the ALRC’s recommendations, which both favour a “real risk of serious harm” 
as the triggering threshold. Yet it is difficult to see how a definitive decision can 
be made for or against a higher or lower triggering threshold without the 
acquisition of reliable and valid evidence regarding the extent and scope of 
Australian data breaches.  
   
The issue of quantification is also relevant to the EU situation and was 
specifically addressed by the European Data Protection Supervisor in his opinion 
on the Proposed Directive.99
“[T]he notification of security breaches will help to identify and carry 
out reliable statistical analysis regarding the most effective security 
solutions and mechanisms. For a long time there has been a shortage 
of hard data about information security failures and the most 
appropriate technologies to protect information. This problem is likely 
to be solved with the security breach notification obligations, as was 
the case with the US security breach reporting laws, because 
notification will give information on the technologies more favourable 
to breaches [emphasis added].” 
 
The statement by the EDPS perhaps paints a rosier picture of the acquisition 
of valid and reliable statistics relating to data breach notifications in the US than 
is warranted. A significant weakness of US state-based data breach notification 
laws is that it has been problematic to accumulate official statistics that provide 
                                                          
98 J Garcia, 'Data Protection, Breach Notification, and the Interplay Between State and 
Federal Law: The Experiments Need More Time' (2007) 17(3) Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 693, 726.  
99 EDPS Opinion, para. 28. 
  
an accurate indication of the extent of data breaches. Different states have 
different reporting regimes and this has restricted the development of centralised 
statistical data about the scope and extent of data breaches in the US. Potentially, 
the same situation could arise for the EU if reporting of breaches to national 
authorities is not conducted in a uniform manner, or at the very least, in a way 
that is mindful of the wider requirement to collate EU-wide statistical 
information, as recognised in the opinion of the EDPS. The EU has identified 
similar concerns relating to the development of organisational inventories and 
the acquisition of best practice measures. However, the need to develop effective 
methods of data gathering about data breaches may not have been fully realised 
and will require further work. If that is the case, the EU needs to address this 
point more comprehensively given the direct relationship that exists between the 
identification of the data breach problem and the provision of an effective 
regulatory regime to remedy that problem. 
 
5.2 An Appropriate Notification Trigger and Regulatory Response 
A particular issue raised by the US literature is notification fatigue. For 
example, Cate argues that a broad definition of “data breach” misses the crucial 
distinction between accidental data loss and malicious data theft, thereby making 
the disclosure obligation meaningless.100 Research conducted by the Ponemon 
Institute regarding respondent reactions to notification letters appears to support 
concerns about notification fatigue as they reported that over 39% of 9,154 
survey respondents initially believed the notification received by an organisation 
that had suffered a data breach was either junk mail, spam or a telemarketing 
phone call.101 Furthermore, 48% of respondents said that the notice was not easy 
to understand, and over 49% of respondents believed that the notice did not 
provide enough details. Actual notification letters themselves have also been a 
point of concern. For example, Choicepoint’s notification letter to persons 
affected by their breach in 2005 attempted to sell consumers access to some of 
their compromised information.102
The mechanism of notification itself is also a contentious issue that has 
been reflected in the US literature. The issues arising from notification appear at 
face value to be simple, but as Schwartz and Janger highlight, the decisions 
involved lead to conceptually complex regulatory structures that are predicated 
on the use of information disclosure as a regulatory mechanism.
 
103
                                                          
100 F H Cate, Information Security Breaches and the Threat to Consumers (2005), 
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/1280/Information_Security_
Breaches.pdf. at July 20, 2009. 
 The authors 
suggest that data breach notification schemes attempt to balance three different 
elements: the mitigation of risks arising from data breaches; the enhancement of 
101 Ponemon Institute, National Survey on Data Security Breach Notification (2005), 3. 
102 P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of Data Security Breaches' (2007) 105(5) 
Michigan Law Review 913, 953.  
103 Ibid., 915. 
  
customer trust by increasing the levels of individual access to information about 
the misuse of personal information and the use of reputational sanction as a 
means to engender improved levels of corporate information security.104 They 
adduced four different data breach notification models that have the same 
underlying purpose but place different emphasis on prioritising which element to 
regulate. The first, the Californian law, is a pure notification model and hence 
has a low triggering threshold because its main regulatory mechanism is 
reputational sanction.105
The second model is based on the Interagency Guidelines highlighted 
above. The Guidelines differ to the Californian model because it provides a two-
tier approach to notification with different triggering thresholds.
 Whilst the Californian law model claims to have a 
damage mitigation purpose, in reality, data breach notification systems based on 
the Californian law, solely focus on notification and pay little regard to the 
aftermath of a data breach. As such, there is little co-ordinated response after a 
data breach and individuals are largely left to prevent any problems themselves.  
106
The third approach is entitled the anonymizing disclosure intermediary 
(ADI) model. It is based on published comments made by the Chicago Financial 
Review Board relating to the Interagency Guidelines.
 The first tier 
has a low threshold of unauthorised access and organisations are required to 
inform an oversight agency if such a breach has taken place. The agency then 
decides, in consultation with the organisation, whether notification is required. 
The second tier has a higher threshold based on the likelihood of misuse and if 
such a breach takes place, the organisation is required to notify affected 
customers and the oversight agency. The advantage of the second model is that it 
facilitates a more co-ordinated mitigation response by the breached organisation, 
regulatory overseers and industry bodies thus ensuring information flow about a 
breach. The mechanism of reputational sanction is still present but it will not be 
used automatically for all incidents and it will only be used where there is a 
likelihood of misuse. 
107 Data breaches are 
reported to a “trusted and neutral third party” that forwards security information 
relating to the breach to other parties and co-ordinates a damage mitigation 
response.108
                                                          
104 Ibid., 918. 
 The intermediary body then, if deems necessary, notifies consumers 
without revealing the identity of the breached organisation. The ADI model 
therefore focuses solely on damage mitigation because it removes the 
mechanism of reputational sanction completely. The fourth approach is called 
the co-ordinated response architecture (CRA) and it is developed by the authors 
as a hybrid of the strengths and weaknesses of the previous three models. The 
CRA has a system of two-track disclosure. The first entails reporting by the 
breached organisation to the CRA then determines whether customer notification 
105 Ibid., 940. 
106 Ibid., 933. 
107 Ibid., 932. 
108 Ibid., 934. 
  
is required based on the likelihood of information misuse. The CRA will 
therefore co-ordinate the sharing of information about a data breach, oversee the 
organisation’s investigation and response and monitor notification decisions.109
As regards Australian developments, the ALRC also envisage a degree of 
co-ordinated response in their recommendations that would place the OPC as the 
co-ordinator of mitigation response. However, in keeping with the “light touch” 
regulation that has permeated Australian privacy regulation since its inception, it 
is difficult to imagine that the OPC would be willing or able to take on the role 
of the co-ordinated response envisaged by the third and fourth models. At 
present, the OPC appears to be offering a role that is equivalent to a watered-
down version of model 2, the Interagency Guidelines, with further scope for 
development, if and when, the Australian Government decides to implement the 
ALRC’s data breach recommendations. That said, the OPC is in the most 
advantageous position to collect evidence on data breaches and undertake the 
quantitative research suggested above, which could found a solid evidential basis 
for any future data breach law and the associated triggering threshold. 
 
The emphasis of the CRA model is mitigation response and notification 
encouragement that seeks organisational co-operation without losing the threat 
of reputational sanction. 
The EU’s approach appears to adopt a higher degree of co-ordinated 
response than the Australian approach envisages which could provide a much 
more hands-on role for national data protection authorities. For example, a 
national authority must be notified by a provider about any personal data breach 
that the authority may have encountered. The authority will also have powers to 
compel a provider to notify in situations where the provider believes it does not 
have to give notification. Furthermore, as highlighted above, national authorities 
will have a prominent role in the development of notification guidelines to 
facilitate best practice. At face value, the powers of the OPC and national data 
protection authorities appear quite similar. However, given the stated importance 
of data protection as a central component of the EU’s ongoing development, it 
would seem likely that national authorities could be required to actively pursue 
the development of data breach notification regulations and responses. Certainly, 
they will be in a strong position to develop policy if it does transpire that they 
are the collecting points of statistical data related to data breaches in the EU. 
Potentially, therefore, national data protection authorities could conceivably 
adopt the type of approach envisaged by Schwartz and Janger’s CRA model. 
Finally, national authorities are not likely to be constrained by the underlying 
notions of light touch regulation that may impact upon the resources given to 
and the willingness of the OPC to undertake regulatory or remedial action. 
 
5.3 A Coherent Conceptual Framework to Mitigate Against Over 
Regulation 
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The overall aim of data breach notification laws is twofold. First, to 
provide a reputational sanction against organisations with poor information 
security practices to ensure that data security policies and procedures become a 
management priority.110 The necessity of data breach notification laws was 
compounded by the fact that public and private sector organisations had little or 
no incentive to report data breaches of personal information because of the 
negative publicity that would arise from notification.111 Second, to formally 
recognise an individual’s “right to know” and thus provide persons who may 
have been affected by a data breach involving their personal information with 
notice of the incident to enable them to take steps to protect themselves from 
identity theft.112 As such, data breach notification laws demand a delicate 
balancing act between mitigating the risk of identity theft, via greater levels of 
information provision to consumers and ensuring that government and corporate 
organisations are not overburdened with excessive notification requirements.113
However, since the inception of data breach laws, the causal link between 
data breaches and identity theft has been brought into question. For example, the 
US Government’s Government Accountability Office reports that whilst data 
breaches of personal information occur frequently resultant incidents of identity 
theft, arising from those breaches, are much rarer.
   
114 The researchers examined 
24 large data breaches and identified three incidents that resulted in frauds of 
existing accounts and one incident that resulted in the unauthorised creation of a 
new bank account.115 The researchers acknowledged that results are not 
conclusive because no government agency is responsible for maintaining data on 
the underlying causes of identity theft and attempts to link a specific data breach 
to a particular identity theft crime is problematic given the proliferation of 
personal information from different sources.116
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 Sophisticated identity theft 
criminals are also aware of credit monitoring systems and quite often retain 
personal information for over a year before attempting to use such data for 
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and Security Survey' (2006) 20. 
112 See e.g. L Rode, Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing the 
Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data Security?, 43 Houston Law Review, 
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fraudulent purposes. Other private sector studies on the relationship between 
data breaches and identity theft have also suggested that identity theft incidents 
are relatively rare.117 Finally, Romanosky et al found that the impact of data 
breach notification laws on the reduction of identity theft was marginal and 
accounted for approximately a 2% decline in the rates of identity theft.118
If there is no causal link between data breaches and identity theft, data 
breach notification could simply add costs to organisations without any 
significant benefit for the consumer. Some US commentators have also argued 
that data breach legislation can be a disproportionate response that is ultimately 
ineffective. For example, Cate
  
119 argues from an organisational perspective, that 
compliance costs could potentially be disproportionate to the low risk of identity 
theft that emanate from a data breach, particularly in light of numerous state 
laws with different notification triggers120 and ambiguous language.121 The costs 
to organisations of repairing damage from a data breach should also not be 
underestimated.  The Ponemon Institute examined the costs incurred by 43 
organisations after they experienced a data breach.122
Lenard and Rubin also contend that organisations should be able to 
determine and notify only those customers at most risk through targeted and 
tailored notification to reduce costs and enhance benefits.
 The study concluded that 
the total average cost of a data breach was US$202 per item of personal 
information and the cost of lost business was estimated to average US$4.59 
million per organisation.  
123 Furthermore, the 
reputational sanction element of data breach notification laws may also overtly 
punish organisations and may actually do more harm to identity theft mitigation 
because of the disincentive it creates to notify.124
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 As such, embarrassing 
organisations through notification has the effect of punishing those parties who 
118 S Romanosky, R Telang, and Acquisti, Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce 
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120 B Faulkner, 'Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws' (2007) 59(5) Florida Law 
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(2007) 1605, 1622.  
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20, 2009. 
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are themselves victims, particularly involving some hacking and employee theft 
related data breaches.125
On the face of it, there appears to be an inherent conflict within the 
concept of US data breach notification laws regarding their dual purpose: the 
notification of individuals for the mitigation of identity theft and the 
enhancement of corporate information security measures through the imposition 
of reputational sanctions. These two purposes provide a relatively cogent 
regulatory response to the situation of identity theft incidents arising from data 
breaches of personal information. However, if such situations do not materialise 
in sufficient quantity and regularity, the conceptual justification for these dual 
purposes is weakened because the regulatory requirements for mass notification 
are very different to those designed to enhance corporate information security 
measures.  
  
An Australian data breach notification law would benefit from having a 
clear conceptual understanding of what the law is intended to achieve and how it 
is intended to achieve its aims. For example, as highlighted above, the ALRC’s 
proposal envisages a degree of co-ordinated response yet, for a number of 
reasons, the OPC may not be the best organisation to fulfil that regulatory role. It 
would appear that notification similar to the Californian law is not central to the 
ALRC’s data breach proposal and therefore a greater emphasis may be placed on 
the regulation and enhancement of corporate security measures involving 
personal information. The upfront recognition that corporate governance issues 
are an integral element of an Australian data breach notification legal framework 
provides a regulatory opportunity to engage with public and private sector 
organisations to reduce levels of secrecy surrounding data breaches through a 
greater willingness to collaborate and communicate. Accordingly, enhanced 
communication, on this difficult subject, could lead to the formation of both 
internal and external partnerships regarding data breaches that involve a diverse 
range of Australian stakeholders from different organisational backgrounds. As 
such, in this regard, the corporate governance element of the ALRC’s data 
breach notification proposal could have a much broader scope that goes beyond 
the enhancement of corporate information security obligations to protect 
personal information, and therefore could have a remit that is wider than the 
functions of the OPC. 
There are also potential concerns relating to the notification requirements 
of the updated e-Privacy Directive particularly with regard to the operational 
construction of the existing Article 4(2) and the new Article 4(3). Article 2(4)(c) 
of the Proposed Directive, inserts the new Article 4(3) but does not replace or 
update Article 4(2). This is a rather odd decision by the drafters of the Proposed 
Directive because it could have the effect of providing two notification triggers. 
The first is the existing Article 4(2) and the wide ranging ‘a breach of the 
security of the network’ to be notified to subscribers of the service. The second 
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is the new Article 4(3) that requires notification of a personal data breach to 
national authorities, and possibly subscribers and individuals, without undue 
delay. Article 4(3) does provide advantages over Article 4(2) because it 
recognises that a data breach could involve the personal data of a non-subscriber 
(i.e. an individual) and is not just limited to a subscriber of the relevant service. 
However, by not deleting or amending Article 4(2), the presumption appears to 
be that all network security breaches still need to be notified to subscribers but 
only breaches involving personal data are required to follow specified 
requirements of Article 4(3) that may require notification to national authorities, 
subscribers or individuals. Articles’ 4(2) and 4(3) would operate more 
effectively if notifications under 4(2) were aimed at national authorities. In fact, 
it would make a lot of sense for a regulator to be aware of all security concerns, 
regardless of whether or not they involve personal data, given the importance of 
the telecommunications sector in the ongoing maintenance of critical 
information infrastructures. It remains to be seen how Articles’ 4(2) and 4(3) 
will operate in conjunction with each other but the two notification triggers 
could lead to an overly complex regulatory regime that requires different types 
of notification, to different parties in relation to different types of security or 
data breaches. 
 
5.4 A Privacy Problem? 
As highlighted above, the US state-based data breach laws cover a range 
of different purposes that cut across diverse legal areas including, privacy, 
identity theft, corporate governance and consumer protection. The Australian 
proposal, which also mirrors the approach of Canada,126
There are fundamental differences between the US, Australia and the EU 
regarding legislative approaches to the protection of personal information. The 
US has adopted a sectoral approach to privacy protection that concentrates 
legislative protections regarding the specific use of personal information in 
certain circumstances, such as the use of driver licence information,
 focuses solely on data 
breach notification as an information privacy related issue to be addressed by 
privacy legislation. However, it is questionable whether the complex and 
multifaceted aims of the US data breach laws can be adequately transposed into 
a legislative amendment focused only on privacy.  
127 health 
insurance information,128 the online activities of minors129 and even video rental 
information.130
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 Data breach notification laws were therefore developed without 
major recourse to privacy related legislation even though they were designed to 
respond to an acute problem that involved the collection, storage and use of 
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personal information. The Australian situation, regarding privacy protection is 
fundamentally different as Australia already has a comprehensive privacy 
regime, both at a Federal and State level that will inevitably shape the 
development of any future mandatory data breach notification law.
For example, the OPC submission to the ALRC’s review of privacy states 
that the Californian legislation is incongruent with the Privacy Act because it 
focuses on data breaches of a technological nature and provides a prescriptive 
method on how organisations should respond to such incidents.
  
131 As such, the 
legislative intent differs to the Privacy Act which seeks a more principled 
approach to the protection of personal information that covers breaches of 
personal records held in any format, regardless of whether it has been 
computerised or not. The majority of US data breach notification laws focus on 
unencrypted, computerised or electronic information which begs the question 
whether it is possible to develop a data breach notification law based on the US 
experience that fulfils the requirements of technological neutrality as demanded 
by the Privacy Act? The ALRC also acknowledged this point and stressed that 
the requirement to notify should not be restricted to computerised information 
and could include situations that involve hard copy documents that have been 
misplaced or disposed of incorrectly.132
The ALRC’s proposal attempts to minimise such situations by providing a 
notification scheme where data breaches are first notified to the Privacy 
Commissioner, who then makes a determination about whether further action 
and additional notifications are required to mitigate the risks arising from the 
data breach. A similar scheme is proposed in the EU. However, questions need 
to be addressed about whether the OPC is the appropriate regulatory body to 
make such determinations because the mandatory reporting requirements of data 
breach notification could be in conflict with the aims of light touch regulation 
that has shaped the development of the OPC’s regulatory approach. At this 
point, it is difficult to imagine that the OPC would either have the powers, the 
resources or the willingness to enforce actions against recalcitrant organisations 
that either fail to notify the OPC or provide inadequate information relating to 
the notification of a data breach. In essence, it is difficult to see how ‘the leopard 
can change its spots’ from being a regulator that is intent on the use of softer 
forms of regulatory powers, to one that can handle the workload required for a 
 However, an upshot of technological 
neutrality could mean that a greater number of data breaches are required to be 
reported, depending on whether those breaches meet the required triggering 
threshold, which could increase the notification burdens on both organisations 
and regulators.  
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mandatory notification scheme and more importantly, one that is willing and 
able to take robust legal action against statutory offenders. As such, doubts exist 
about whether the Privacy Act  is the most optimum legislative vehicle for the 
implementation of an Australian data breach notification law and whether the 
OPC is the most appropriate regulatory body to manage the requirements of a 
data breach notification law.  
The EU situation is somewhat different. First, as highlighted above, the 
issue of data breach notification is the subject of contested political debate. 
Second, legal developments have thus far focused on the narrower purposes of 
the e-Privacy Directive rather than the all embracing scope of the Data 
Protection Directive. This in itself is interesting. Greenleaf et al have questioned 
the ALRC’s data breach notification proposal and have suggested that data 
breach notification should become a privacy principle to give it sufficient weight 
and force.133
 
 Similar questions can be raised about the EU’s approach and the 
choice of legislative vehicle, the e-Privacy Directive, to implement a data breach 
notification scheme. By focusing on the e-Privacy Directive, rather than the Data 
Protection Directive, the EU’s legislative bodies are implicitly contending that 
data breach notification is an adjunct to the wider aims of data protection, even 
though data breach notification shares a fundamental link with data protection. It 
remains to be seen whether this reflects a wider conceptual understanding of the 
regulatory requirements of data breach notification or whether this has been a 
facet of political deal-making to ensure the implementation of a data breach 
scheme in some form or the other. Data breach notification is therefore treated, 
from a legislative perspective, as something separate to the regulation of data 
protection. This is paradoxical to the Australian situation, which is ironic, given 
the commitment to and the resources available to both EU institutions and 
member state national data protection authorities compared to their Australian 
counterparts.  
6. Conclusion 
The seemingly simple concept of data breach notification laws reveal a 
complex conceptual and regulatory framework that seeks to enhance the 
protection of individual interests through the enforcement of good governance 
techniques involving the protection of personal information. The proliferation of 
US state-based data breach notification laws has complicated matters because of 
the different use of language and threshold triggers in use. Federal developments 
have mirrored state level discussions and the opportunity to harmonise 
conflicting state-based laws may have been missed. International interest in data 
breach notification laws is manifold and it thus appears likely that more data 
breach notification laws will be implemented.  
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As explained in this article, it is more than likely that an Australian data 
breach notification law will be enacted within the immediate future.  In that 
respect, further research will be required to quantify the scope of data breaches 
in Australia, once the path of possible law reform becomes clear. This point was 
explicitly acknowledged by the OPC in their submission to the ALRC’s review 
of privacy. The Privacy Commissioner recognised that data breach notification 
was a newly developing area of law and that it maybe hasty to implement an 
immediate mandatory reporting scheme. The Commissioner recommended that 
further research be conducted to examine the effect that laws have had on other 
jurisdictions and to assess the appropriate form for reporting data breach 
incidents in Australia.134
Australian developments will no doubt be watched keenly in Europe as 
many of the issues highlighted in this article as being pertinent to Australia will 
also have salience to the European situation. Of particular interest should be 
whether a data breach notification scheme can be successfully implemented by 
amending existing information privacy legislation. Conversely to the EU, during 
the next 12 months, Australia will be embarking on many of the political 
discussions that have thus far characterised the development of the EU’s 
attempts at data breach notification. Whilst the preamble to the Proposed 
Directive signifies a commitment to enact a broader data breach notification 
scheme, the extent and scope of such a scheme is still a contested issue that will 
require ongoing political debate within the EU’s legislative institutions and 
within member states. The US experience is showing that conceptual clarity 
regarding the purpose of mandatory data breach notification law is essential to 
its ultimate effectiveness. The regulatory requirements of a data breach 
notification scheme that is focused only on the telecommunications sector is 
very different to a scheme that has extended or potentially universal coverage. 
 The authors agree that further research is required to 
quantify the scope of data breaches in Australia and the OPC appears to be in a 
prime position to collate and co-ordinate further research into the extent of the 
problem. The importance of this future research should not be underestimated 
because the US situation has shown that the scope of the problem itself affects 
the effectiveness of data breach notification laws based on different triggering 
thresholds. The ALRC’s data breach recommendations also highlighted similar 
concerns so it would appear unlikely that an Australian data breach notification 
law will be based on the Californian model. One of the successes of the 
Californian law has been its ability to inform policy makers about a previously 
unseen problem. Whether an Australian data breach notification law with a 
higher threshold can achieve the same success remains to be seen but without 
better knowledge of the extent of data breaches in Australia, an effective and 
appropriate regulatory approach may continue to be problematic.  
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This key issue will need to be addressed directly during the next phases of 
political debate to ensure that a workable scheme is founded on existing 
experiences rather than the political exigencies of the most powerful EU 
institutions.  
Mandatory data breach notification is a topic that is clearly giving rise to 
extensive international debate in the field of privacy. It should be noted that 
whilst there has been a proliferation of data breach notification laws during the 
last few years, and whilst data breach notification has been very successful at 
highlighting serious problems to be addressed, it remains unclear how successful 
the laws are at remedying the problems that they find.  Much therefore is to be 
gained from the instigation of an international corpus to monitor and to review 
the different types of data breach notification schemes currently being adopted 
or those that are in operation. The data breach notification journey may have 
started but there remains some distance to travel before the complex regulatory, 
social and legal impacts are fully understood.   
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